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This is a very special and much needed collection of papers concerning "dia-
loguing with Needham" at the end of the 20th century. The collection has its
origin in a conference organized jointly by India's National Institute of Science,
Technology and Development Studies (NISTADS), the Delhi Science Forum,
and the Maison de Sciences de l'Homme, Paris, held at New Delhi in September
1996. This indeed seems to be just the kind of cooperation and place for a con-
ference that would have pleased Needham himself, while the conference itself,
'Science the Refreshing River,' according to the editors of this volume, "was
conceived of as a homage to Joseph Needham and inspired by and reflecting
Needham's lifelong engagement with crossing disciplinary and institutional
boundaries..." (Preface, vii).
Basically, Situating the History of Science (Situating hereafter) consists of 13
essays in the following categories: introduction, the social epistemology of
Needhamian historiography, historiography of the sciences, and the universality
of science reconsidered. The contributors of these essays primarily come from
France and India, with a few from Canada and the United Kingdom, and they are
mostly historians, sociologists, theorists of science studies and development
studies, as well as philosophers. Interestingly, there seems to be no contributor
or participant from East Asia or China, whose history Needham and his
collaborators spent most of their energy in studying.
What are the major issues which have been chosen for this collection of pa-
pers intended as a homage to Needham? At least two recur throughout Situating,
and seem to be the focus of most papers, namely, the end of cold-war ideology
and extreme internalism in the history of science, and the so-called cultural turn
in science studies, with its more extreme directions such as post-modernism and
cultural studies. Indeed, I think that one special strength and attraction of this
volume, with Needham and his legacy in mind, is that it provides the opportunity
to learn what these scholars in science studies (specialised in Chinese and Indian
sciences!) say about these hot topics, already so thoroughly discussed by "main-
stream" Western intellectuals.
It is certainly interesting to see how the "cold-war ideology" (characterised
by a neutral and apolitical stance, plus extreme internalistic orientation in history
of science) is used by a number of papers to explain the decline of "the Needham
spirit" during that era. Thus, according to Elzinga's paper, we saw in the cold-
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war years the eclipse of the social history of science, or the abstraction of
science from its social/political contexts, and presumably a decline of spirit of
social responsibility among scientists. In a different way, in Raina & Habib's
paper, we can perceive this problem in the non-emergence of a Needhamian
history of sciences in post-war India. Although this is certainly not the place to
discuss the launch of a full-scale attack on Thomas Kuhn in Steve Fuller's new
book, some of Fuller's earlier mockings of Kuhn's popular "normal science" talks
(supposedly used if not specially designed by cold-war ideology to suppress
"critical rationalism"), or Fuller's "parable for postmodern times" (1992), were
cited by Elzinga (p. 100) and highlighted in the Introduction (by Raina, p. 6) to
underscore the problem and influence of cold-war ideology on the history of
science in general. With the official close of the cold-war era, the historiography
of the history of science therefore should be set free and granted a new
departure, and with it, a revival of some of Needham's more sophisticated
historical visions.
While very much applauding the recent scholarship on the history of cold-
war science by Paul Forman and others, I am somewhat uneasy about this heavy
attack on internalism and the supposed essential connection between it and cold-
war ideology. To avoid throwing out the baby with the bath water, we should not
ignore the better aspects achieved by the internalist historians of science in past
decades. Moreover, dialectically speaking, without the challenges and develop-
ments in internalism during the cold-war era, the level of sophistication in social
studies of science could not have reached the height we have now. Instead, we
might still be stuck with the traditional "Bernalism, social class and the social
function of science" (p. 99). The supposed essential connection between inter-
nalism and cold-war ideology is indeed an issue that is both revealing and prob-
lematic. Much more detailed studies are needed in order to better reveal the ex-
tent to which our academic identities and scholarship have been constructed by
cold-war discourses. How strong was its hold, and who has been able to actually
escape from it? But it is also problematic in the sense that it is easy to discern
many challenges and developments in the cold-war era in both the history of
science and the social activism of scientists—challenges that are in contradiction
with dominant cold-war ideology. Social studies of science and sociology of
scientific knowledge (SSK) had already emerged in the 1970's, and social aware-
ness and activism among scientists has been developing again since World War
II, most especially after the protests of the 1960's. Thus, the whole picture is
certainly a good deal more complicated. Meanwhile, prompted by these post-
cold-war reflections, I was also wondering about what our own communities in
the history of Chinese science were doing during that era, both as historians and
social intellectuals.
Besides the end of the cold-war, the end of the 20th century has also been
characterised as the end of many other things in science studies, such as the end
of objectivity, rationality, and universality, as some more radical trends of the
general "cultural turn" of science studies would have it. Where is Needham's
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heritage then to be situated in this cultural turn? For the sake of argument, I shall
divide the issue of this cultural turn into two aspects in order to better engage in
a dialogue with this volume under review; first, the positive theme of turning
away from the traditional Eurocentric narrative of history of science under such
guises as objectivity and universality, and secondly, the negative theme of
stressing the culturally constructive and historically contingent nature of various
scientific traditions to the extent of denying abstract rationality, embracing an-
thropological relativism, and finally treating discourses of objectivity and truth
as forms of power strategies.
Let me first discuss the positive theme of turning away from Eurocentrism
and affirming various non-European knowledge traditions. It is certainly on this
score that Needham's heritage and his collective efforts acquire a firm position in
the changing picture of the history of science and are highly regarded by con-
temporary feminist science studies activists, such as Sandra Harding and others.
Thus Raina and Habib have aptly considered Needham's works as "the first de-
centring" of the Eurocentric Old Big Picture of science (p. 284), well before the
contemporary second decentring in the cultural turn. The general collective
achievement by Needham and others in this respect is endorsed by all contribu-
tors of this volume. More specifically, however, Needham's special theories and
governing models in this first "decentring" are not without their problems.1 For
example, his cross-cultural diffusion theory of science and technology in history,
important for his argument concerning the great Chinese contributions to modern
science, has often been challenged by critics (see Blue's article, pp. 49-50). Al-
though his diffusion theory has potential, as further considered and developed by
Fuller and Paty's articles in this volume, much more elaboration is needed. I will
come back to this later. As for his dominant model for the relationship between
modern science and various ethnoscientific traditions (European included),
nothing is more famous than his "rivers and sea" metaphor: "the older streams of
science in different civilizations like rivers flowing into the ocean of modern
science" (p. 220). However, as accurately pointed out by Chemla in her article,
this model has serious limitations, most specifically that it often ignores knowl-
edge traditions that had no chance to flow into the ocean (forming an "inland
lake" instead), and by taking modern science as the "ocean," Needham often
unwittingly privileged the European scientific tradition.
Moreover, there is the famous problem for Needham that he uses "modern
scientific disciplinary categories to classify and analyse traditional Chinese
                                                
1 In Gregory Blue's article of this volume, "Science(s), Civilization(s), Historie(s)," p.
49, he cited Derk Bodde's book, and comments "[Bodde's] criticism of Needham's appre-
ciation of Daoism may well be telling, and seems to be fairly widely shared, though
Needham himself remained unrepentant." I would just like to indicate here a recent re-
evaluation of the relationship between science and Daoism by Alexei Volkov, who found
merits in Needham's original formulation and questioned instead Sivin's later criticism of
Needham's Daoist appreciation. See Volkov's "Science and Daoism: An Introduction," in
Taiwanese Journal for Philosophy & History of Science no. 8 (1996-1997), pp.1-58.
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thinking about nature" (p. 46). There is much that could be said about this prob-
lem—perhaps one of the most commonly made mistakes by historians of non-
European knowledge traditions—but I must stop here in order to continue my
review. These suspicious residuals of Eurocentrism, therefore, are still present in
Needham's first decentring, and often pointed out by his critics in the second
decentring, all of whom were actually standing on his shoulders in order to see
further. Now, since the first decentring was incomplete, how about the second
decentring?
Let us turn to the "negative theme" of the cultural turn. If we consider the ne-
gations proclaimed by the cultural turn from simple perspectives like rationalism
or realism, it is easy to arrive at the conclusion that the notions of the objectivity
and universality of science are under serious attack. The much feared relativism
seems to be winning the day. However, the situation is, of course, much more
subtle. In a certain sense, Elzinga's article argues that Needham's "ecumenical
science" project is on the same side as Said's post-colonial "hybridity" in going
against "Seyyed Hossein Nasr's gnosis-oriented call for a resacralization of sci-
ence" (p. 103), or any other "totalizing narratives, whether they come from East
or West" (p. 104). It is impressive to read how Elzinga tries, very seriously, to
situate Needham's vision and project within the difficult and philosophically
demanding discourses of post-colonial hybridity and difference. This is indeed a
dialogue of great effort. However, when Elzinga tries to criticise hyperreflexity
and postmodern hybridity from a Needhamian perspective, it looks a bit too sim-
ple, and much more elaboration is really needed. Let me say a few more words
on this point.
Against post-colonial difference and incommensurability, Elzinga poses
Needhamian projects of cross-cultural comparative studies. And against the
negation of universality of science, Paty poses cross-cultural transmission and
diffusion of knowledge as a new form of universality (p. 317). From a strategic
point of view, both Elzinga and Paty seem to have taken a clever position in
overcoming the negations and reinstating modern science in a new ecumenical
spirit. However, there are tremendous epistemological difficulties to overcome
before a sophisticated theory of cross-cultural comparison can be established.
Theories of post-colonial difference or Kuhnian incommensurability in history
of science cannot simply be dismissed by the charge of hyperreflexity. They are
either to be refuted or we must live with them.2 It is one thing to listen to this
Needhamian dialogue and its discontent: "How then do we get out of this blind
alley in which cultural analysis of a hyperreflexity kind leads to an infinite re-
gress, disabling us from doing anything but comparison as a work of bric-a-brac
juxtapositions?" (p. 111). But it is quite another to construct a social and episte-
mological theory of cross-cultural comparison or dialogue that can meet the
                                                
2 For a discussion of Kuhnian incommensurablity, with the history of Chinese science
in mind, see Daiwie Fu "Higher Taxonomy and Higher Incommensurability," Studies in
History and Philosophy of Science vol. 26, no.2 (1995), pp.273-294.
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challenges from incommensurability, or that can achieve deeper meaning, and
thus go beyond the mere bric-a-brac juxtaposition kind of shallow comparison.
However, so far as I can see in this volume, an adequate epistemology for cross-
cultural comparison or dialogue has yet to be constructed and tested.
Despite a strategic angle that has been highlighted by Elzinga, Paty, and pos-
sibly Fuller in this volume, it seems to me that the real content is yet to be
fleshed out. No wonder, perhaps, that Raina and Habib express uneasiness re-
garding the future of civilisation studies in the light of the second decentring. In
a very interesting paper, "The Missing Picture," Raina and Habib finally bring us
back to the issue of how to situate Needham's projects in the horizons of Asian
people, historians and intellectuals, be they Indians, Chinese, or Taiwanese. It is
a very pleasant experience to read how Raina and Habib explain the social and
conceptual obstacles in the way of the non-emergence of a Needhamian history
of sciences of India. So many factors concerning the development of history of
science in various third world Asian countries are common! In the end, Raina
and Habib have reflected to the point of asking not merely the non-emergence
question, but also "why a Needhamian history of sciences of India" in the first
place (p. 298). Indeed, besides the fact that Needham's voluminous works have
enriched the history of Chinese science corpus, and the fact that he substantially
contributed to the Western "recognition" of Chinese national achievements, how
else should or would Needham's vision and project relate to the concerns of East
Asian historians and scientists?
While receiving numerous exceptional plaudits from China, Needham seems
to exert little influence on the historiography of science as evidenced in the case
of mathematics, according to Jami's article in this volume. Therefore, Jami is
tempted to conclude that "the main value of Needham's enterprise from the view-
point dominant in China is that, as a distinguished member of the Western scien-
tific establishment, he granted recognition and legitimacy to China's scientific
tradition" (p. 272). Naturally, I do not believe that Needham's enterprise
deserves only this much to the East Asian people. While post-colonialism intel-
lectuals like Said were worrying about the power effect radiated from the impe-
rial orientalist establishment, the career of Needham's SCC corpus in East Asia is
a rather different story. We East Asian historians and intellectuals should instead
worry about the "uses and abuses" of Needham's works by Asian powers and
nationalistic technocrats.3 Indeed it is by no means uncommon that problems and
shortcomings of Needham's projects viewed from the cultural turn (or from the
second decentring), actually become virtues and axioms of many US-trained
                                                
3 In a recent article on "crossing taxonomies and boundaries," I discuss the merits and
problems of Needham's methodology of comparative histories of science with Dr. Chris-
topher Cullen. I specifically wrote: "[SCC] is fruitful,...only in the beginning phases, and
I must confess that, as a historian of Chinese science, I often feel [in East Asia] the his-
torical burden of its greatness." See my "Crossing Taxonomies and Boundaries: A Critical
Note on Comparative History of Science and Zhao Youqin's 'Optics'," Taiwanese Journal
for Philosophy & History of Science no. 8 (1996-1997), p.110.
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East Asian technocrats. It is an irony sometimes for me doing the history of
Chinese science in East Asia, that, while admiring Needham's vision and spirit, I
often need to criticize Needhamian products, especially those made in East Asia.
